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INTRODUCTION 
“[T]he exclusion of Trinity Lutheran from a public benefit for which it is 
otherwise qualified, solely because it is a church, is odious to our 
Constitution . . . and cannot stand.”
1
  The Court’s sweeping language in its 
recent Trinity Lutheran decision has been called a “new constitutional rule”2 
and lauded as a “landmark victory” by proponents of religious liberty.
3
  On 
the other side of the discussion, constitutional law scholar Erwin 
Chemerinsky described the decision as troubling: “a dramatic change in the 
law that likely is going to require governments to provide much greater 
support for religious institutions than ever before.”
4
  The decision could also 
substantially limit state sovereignty in religious establishment.  As Justice 
Sotomayor briefly alluded to in her dissent,
5
 Trinity Lutheran could be the 
death knell for antiestablishment clauses on the books in nearly forty states: 
“no-aid provisions” that expressly restrict government funding to religious 
entities. 
In contrast, this paper proposes that state no-aid provisions can in fact be 
reconciled with the distinctions in Trinity Lutheran.  Lower courts and 
legislatures alike should recognize the nuances in these distinctions before 
radically extending taxpayer-funded benefits to religious institutions. 
This paper proceeds in three parts.  First, Part I gives background on the 
federal Religion Clauses and no-aid provisions in state constitutions.  Next, 
Part II details the Trinity Lutheran decision.  Finally, Part III first provides a 
legal and normative analysis of the Court’s decision, and then discusses the 
implications for state no-aid provisions. 
 
 * J.D., 2018, Chicago-Kent College of Law. 
 1 Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2025 (2017). 
 2 William E. Thro & Charles J. Russo, Odious to the Constitution: The Educational Implications of 
Trinity Lutheran Church v. Comer, 346 EDUC. L. REP. (West) 1, 1 (2017). 
 3 Press Release, U.S. Senator for Texas Ted Cruz, Sen Cruz: Trinity Lutheran Decision Is 
“Landmark Victory for Religious Freedom” (June 26, 2017), 
https://www.cruz.senate.gov/?p=press_release&id=3204. 
 4 Erwin Chemerinsky, Waiting for Gorsuch: October Term 2016, 20 GREEN BAG 2D 351, 358 
(2017). 
 5 Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2037–38 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
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I.  BACKGROUND 
A.  The Federal Religion Clauses 
The First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no law 
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof.”
6
  The Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clause subsumed in 
this statement collectively comprise the Constitution’s Religion Clauses.  The 
two Clauses have long been described as being “frequently in tension.”
7
  For 
example, in Everson v. Board of Education, the seminal case incorporating 
the Establishment Clause as to the states, the Court stated that, on the one 
hand, “[n]o tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any 
religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever 
form they may adopt to teach or practice religion.”
8
 
However, the Court went on to conclude that, “[o]n the other hand, 
other language of the [First A]mendment commands that [a state] cannot 
hamper its citizens in the free exercise of their own religion” and thus 
“cannot exclude . . . members of any . . . faith, because of their faith, or lack 
of it, from receiving the benefits of public welfare legislation.”9  Based on 
these principles, the Everson Court held that a state program providing bus 
transportation to parochial-school and public-school students alike did not 
violate the Establishment Clause.  While the Court has tried to ease this 
“tension” in later decisions,
10
 such neutrality towards religion and non-
religion has been one of the consistent principles underpinning the doctrinal 
development of the Religion Clauses.
11
 
1. Establishment Clause 
Establishment Clause doctrine—particularly in the government benefit 
context relevant to Trinity Lutheran’s facts—has undergone substantial 
 
 6 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 7 Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 718 (2004) (citing Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 469 (1973)). 
 8 Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947). 
 9 Id. (emphasis in original); see also Douglas Laycock, Churches, Playgrounds, Government 
Dollars—and Schools?, 131 HARV. L. REV. 133, 138 (2017) (discussing how the two principles are 
disjointed, but exclusion is not an option). 
 10 Id. at 138. 
 11 Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970) (“The course of constitutional neutrality in this 
area cannot be an absolutely straight line; rigidity could well defeat the basic purpose of these 
provisions, which is to insure that no religion be sponsored or favored, none commanded, and 
none inhibited.  The general principle deducible from the First Amendment and all that has been 
said by the Court is this: that we will not tolerate either governmentally established religion or 
governmental interference with religion.  Short of those expressly proscribed governmental acts 
there is room for play in the joints productive of a benevolent neutrality which will permit religious 
exercise to exist without sponsorship and without interference.”).  
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evolution since the Court’s seemingly contradictory language in Everson.12  In 
invalidating two separate state programs providing salary and materials 
reimbursements to sectarian school teachers, the Court in Lemon v. 
Kurtzman articulated a three-part test to determine whether a statute violates 
the Establishment Clause: “First, the statute must have a secular legislative 
purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither 
advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster ‘an excessive 
government entanglement with religion.’”
13
 
Under the Lemon test, government funding generally must be restricted 
to secular uses to avoid impermissibly advancing religion.  For example, in 
Tilton v. Richardson, a companion case to Lemon, the Court held that a 
federal program providing construction grants directly to colleges and 
universities, but expressly limiting the use of funds to facilities that were not 
used “for sectarian instruction or religious worship,” was permissible under 
the Establishment Clause.
14
  But the Court severed a provision in the 
program that allowed the government’s property interest in the facility to 
expire after twenty years because it could have “the effect of advancing 
religion” “[i]f, at the end of 20 years, the building is, for example, converted 
into a chapel or otherwise used to promote religious interests.”
15
 
Subsequent decisions also considered the religious character of the 
recipient, prohibiting “state aid . . . to institutions that are so ‘pervasively 
sectarian’ that secular activities cannot be separated from sectarian ones.”
 16
  
Notably, in Aguilar v. Felton and its companion case, School District of 
Grand Rapids v. Ball, the Court invalidated state programs that sent publicly 
funded teachers into parochial schools to teach classes.
17
  Among other 
things, the Court reasoned that the pervasively sectarian nature of the schools 
could have influenced the publicly funded teachers to religiously indoctrinate 
students.  Further, the teachers effectively subsidized the religious functions 
of the school by reducing its responsibility for teaching secular subjects.
18
 
 
 12 See Laycock, supra note 9, at 137–38. 
 13 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971) (citations omitted) (quoting Walz, 397 U.S. at 
674). 
 14 Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 683–84 (1971). 
 15 Id. at 683; see also Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 744 (1973) (upholding state revenue bond 
program that financed facilities at religious colleges and universities because, inter alia, the program 
excluded worship and religious instruction facilities). 
 16 Roemer v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 755, 759 (1976) (finding that universities at issue 
were not “pervasively sectarian” and upholding state statute granting annual subsidy to religiously 
affiliated private colleges and universities, provided that colleges did not provide only religious 
degrees and complied with “statutory prohibition against sectarian use, and . . . administrative 
enforcement”). 
 17 Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 408–12, (1985), overruled by Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 235 
(1997); Sch. Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 397 (1985), overruled by Agostini, 521 
U.S. at 235. 
 18 Ball, 473 U.S. at 397; see also Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 412 (“First . . . the aid is provided in a 
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However, the Court has increasingly liberalized its approach to 
government funding of religious institutions.  First, it has recognized a 
distinction between benefits provided directly to religious entities and 
benefits provided indirectly, or “only as a result of the genuinely 
independent and private choices of aid recipients.”
19
  For example, the 
Establishment Clause did not bar a student from using a state-provided 
education grant at a religious college in Witters v. Washington Department 
of Services for the Blind.
20
  The fact that the funding was provided directly to 
the student, who then independently chose to use the aid to attend a 
religious school, “ma[de] the link between the State and the school petitioner 
wishe[d] to attend a highly attenuated one.”
21
  Put another way, there is no 
“proximate cause” for an Establishment Clause violation with indirect aid: 
the recipient’s independent choice to use such funding at a religious 
institution is akin to a superseding act that “breaks the chain of causation”—
here, the connection with state action.
22
  However, since the state’s 
constitution included a provision precluding any aid to religious entities, the 
Court remanded the case back to the state court, noting that “[o]n remand, 
the state court is of course free to consider the applicability of the ‘far 
stricter’ dictates of the . . . State Constitution.”
23
 
Second, the neutrality of a funding program has become more relevant in 
permitting direct aid to flow to religious institutions.  Overruling Aguilar and 
Ball, the Court in Agostini v. Felton held that state programs sending public 
school teachers into religious schools did not violate the Establishment 
Clause.
24
  Noting a “change[ ]” in their “understanding of the criteria used to 
assess whether aid to religion has an impermissible effect,”
25
 the Court 
concluded that the programs there would not impermissibly advance 
 
pervasively sectarian environment.  Second, because assistance is provided in the form of teachers, 
ongoing inspection is required to ensure the absence of a religious message.”). 
 19 Witters v. Wash. Dep’t of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 486–87 (1986). 
 20 Id. at 489. 
 21 Id. at 488; see also Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 653–56, 662–63 (2002) (holding that 
a state school voucher program that allowed recipients to use educational grants at private religious 
schools did not violate the Establishment Clause because the program was religiously neutral and 
one of “true private choice,” where the state provided funds directly to parents who, in turn, 
endorsed checks over to schools); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 398–401 (1983) (holding that a 
state statute allowing taxpayers to deduct education expenses incurred in sending their children to 
religious schools did not violate the Establishment Clause, as deduction was available to all 
taxpayers generally and any aid to religious schools was the result of parents’ independent choices). 
 22 See Stuart M. SPEISER ET AL., 3 AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS § 11:9 (Westlaw rev. ed. 2018) (“A 
‘superseding cause’ breaks the chain of causation that the defendant began with his or her conduct.  
It is a separate act that operates as an independent force to produce the victim’s injury.” (citing State 
v. Smith, 819 N.W.2d 724 (Minn. Ct. App. 2012), aff’d, 835 N.W.2d 1 (Minn. 2013)).  I am 
indebted to Professor Sheldon Nahmod for this proximate cause analogy. 
 23 Witters, 474 U.S. at 489 (quoting Witters v. Comm’n for the Blind, 689 P.2d 53, 55 (Wash. 
1984)). 
 24 Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 234–35 (1997). 
 25 Id. at 223. 
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religion, nor would pervasive monitoring to ensure secular instruction be 
required.  Namely, it could not be presumed that the publicly funded 
teachers would depart from their secular duties and teach religious doctrine.
26
  
And, importantly, the aid was allocated according to neutral, secular criteria 
based on student need regardless of where they attended school, which 
reduced the likelihood of the state funding religious indoctrination or a 
perceived government endorsement of religion.
27
 
Mitchell v. Helms reaffirmed the Court’s doctrinal shift and cast further 
doubt on its prior prohibitions on aid to “pervasively sectarian” institutions, 
this time rejecting an as-applied Establishment Clause challenge to an aid 
program.
28
  Here, state and local agencies had received federal funds to 
purchase secular educational materials and had in turn loaned those 
materials to “pervasively sectarian” Catholic schools in the state.
29
  Justice 
Thomas, writing for the plurality, reasoned that the aid itself was secular and 
provided for education, not indoctrination; thus, “the religious nature of a 
recipient should not matter to the constitutional analysis, so long as the 
recipient adequately furthers the government’s secular purpose.”
30
  Further, 
Thomas extended the “independent and private choices” analysis from 
Witters and Agostini.  Since the materials were distributed to schools on a 
neutral, per
-
capita enrollment basis, he concluded that this “direct” aid to 
religious schools was the result of the private choices of the attending 
students.
31
  Due to these private choices, “any use of that aid to indoctrinate 
[could not] be attributed to the government and [was] thus not of 
constitutional concern.”
32
 
In her concurrence, Justice O’Connor, joined by Justice Breyer, agreed 
that the program’s neutral, secular criteria would not impermissibly advance 
religion.  However, she rejected the plurality’s analysis that such neutrality 
made the program presumptively constitutional, calling it a rule of 
“unprecedented breadth.”
33
  Moreover, she refused to view direct aid made 
on a per capita basis the same as indirect aid made as the result of private 
choice, reasoning that direct aid to religious institutions increases the 
perception of government endorsement of religion.  As such, actual 
diversion of direct aid to religious uses is still impermissible under the 
 
 26 Id. at 226–27, 233–34. 
 27 Id. at 231–32. 
 28 See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 807–08 (2000) (plurality opinion) (recognizing that Agostini 
“recast Lemon’s entanglement inquiry as simply one criterion relevant to determining a statute’s 
effect”). 
 29 Id. at 801–03. 
 30 Id. at 827, 829. 
 31 Id. at 829–31. 
 32 Id. at 820. 
 33 Id. at 837 (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment). 
6 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW ONLINE [Vol. 21:1 
Establishment Clause.
34
 
2.  Free Exercise Clause 
The “tension” between avoiding establishment and protecting the right to 
religious conscience also runs through the development of free exercise 
doctrine.
35
  Historically, the Court had strictly scrutinized and almost 
invariably invalidated government actions that substantially burdened 
religious practice or belief.
36
  For example, in Sherbert v. Verner, the Court 
held that the state’s employment commission violated the petitioner’s free 
exercise rights when it disqualified her for unemployment benefits after she 
was terminated for refusing to work on her religion’s Sabbath.
37
  First, here 
the petitioner’s religious practice was substantially burdened, as the 
commission’s “ruling force[d] her to choose between following the precepts 
of her religion and forfeiting benefits, on the one hand, and abandoning one 
of the precepts of her religion in order to accept work, on the other hand.”
38
  
The Court then applied strict scrutiny.
39
  Concluding that the state would 
need to show a compelling interest to justify such a burden, the Court found 
the state’s interest in reducing fraudulent unemployment claims and 
unencumbering employers’ scheduling abilities constitutionally insufficient.
40
 
 
 34 Id. at 840–44. 
 35 See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 220–21 (1972) (“The Court must not ignore the danger that 
an exception from a general obligation of citizenship on religious grounds may run afoul of the 
Establishment Clause, but that danger cannot be allowed to prevent any exception no matter how 
vital it may be to the protection of values promoted by the right of free exercise.  By preserving 
doctrinal flexibility and recognizing the need for a sensible and realistic application of the Religion 
Clauses ‘we have been able to chart a course that preserved the autonomy and freedom of religious 
bodies while avoiding any semblance of established religion.  This is a ‘tight rope’ and one we have 
successfully traversed.’” (citation omitted) (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 672 
(1970))). 
 36 Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 907 (1990) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“This Court over the 
years painstakingly has developed a consistent and exacting standard to test the constitutionality of a 
state statute that burdens the free exercise of religion.  Such a statute may stand only if the law in 
general, and the State’s refusal to allow a religious exemption in particular, are justified by a 
compelling interest that cannot be served by less restrictive means.”). 
 37 374 U.S. 398, 409–10 (1963). 
 38 Id. at 404. 
 39 Id. at 406 (“We must next consider whether some compelling state interest enforced in the 
eligibility provisions of the South Carolina statute justifies the substantial infringement of appellant’s 
First Amendment right.”); see also Yoder, 406 U.S. at 218 (holding that the application of 
Wisconsin’s compulsory school attendance law to Amish families who did not send their children 
to school after the eighth grade violated their free exercise rights); id. at 215 (“The essence of all 
that has been said and written on the subject is that only those interests of the highest order and 
those not otherwise served can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion.”). 
 40 Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 407; see also Hobbie v. Unemp’t Appeals Comm’n, 480 U.S. 136, 139–40 
(1987) (holding that state employment commission violated petitioner’s free exercise rights in 
denying unemployment benefits where petitioner was terminated for refusing to work on Sabbath); 
Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 717–18 (1981) (holding that the state unemployment board 
violated claimant’s free exercise rights for refusing unemployment benefits where claimant quit job 
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Similarly, significant disqualifications or penalties based on religious 
status may constitute substantial burdens.  In McDaniel v. Paty, the Court 
invalidated a state constitutional provision disqualifying ministers or other 
clergy members from serving as delegates to the state constitutional 
convention.
41
  Despite the historical antiestablishment rationales for clergy-
disqualification in government positions, the Court held that the state 
provision violated the petitioner’s free exercise:  he could not simultaneously 
enjoy his rights to religious practice and to seek and hold office “because the 
State has conditioned the exercise of one on the surrender of the other.”
42
 
However, the Court reevaluated its free exercise standards in 
Employment Division v. Smith, and held that the government is not required 
to provide exemptions for incidental burdens on religious practice due to 
compliance with neutral, generally applicable laws.
43
  Declining to apply 
Sherbert’s strict-scrutiny balancing test, the Smith Court concluded that the 
state unemployment commission’s denial of unemployment benefits to 
claimants who were fired for illegal drug use after taking peyote for religious 
reasons did not violate the Free Exercise Clause.
44
  The Court reasoned that 
the law was neutral and generally applicable as it did not attempt to regulate 
religious belief and was an “across-the-board criminal prohibition”;
45
 religious 
exemptions from such laws would cause each person “to become a law unto 
himself.”
46
  Accordingly, neutral, generally applicable laws are now typically 
only subject to rational basis review.
47
 
In contrast, laws that work to target religious practice or demonstrate 
animus or hostility towards religion are subject to strict scrutiny.
48
  In Church 
of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, the Court found that, 
while a series of municipal ordinances prohibiting animal sacrifice appeared 
facially neutral, the ordinances explicitly targeted the Santería religion’s 
practices through references to ritual sacrifice, and the actual effect of the 
laws was to purposefully discriminate against the church’s religion.
49
  Taken 
together, “almost the only conduct subject to [the ordinances] . . . [was] the 
religious exercise of [the] church members.”
50
 
 
after being transferred to the weapons production department because their religious beliefs 
forbade production of armaments). 
 41 435 U.S. 618, 629 (1978). 
 42 Id. at 626. 
 43 494 U.S. 872, 878 (1990). 
 44 Id. at 882. 
 45 Id. at 882, 884. 
 46 Id. at 885 (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 167 (1878)). 
 47 See id. at 878–79 (“We have never held that an individual’s religious beliefs excuse him from 
compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that the State is free to regulate.”).  
 48 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 546 (1993). 
 49 Id. at 535. 
 50 Id. 
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Recently, the Court has further clarified that state animus or hostility 
towards religion demonstrates a lack of neutrality.
51
  A Colorado baker 
sanctioned for violating the state’s public accommodation law for refusing to 
provide a wedding cake for a gay couple due to his religious beliefs recently 
prevailed on his free exercise claim in Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. 
Colorado Civil Rights Commission.52  There, the Court found that comments 
made by members of the state civil rights commission while adjudicating the 
baker’s claim, including describing his refusal as “one of the most despicable 
pieces of rhetoric that people can use,” evidenced “clear and impermissible 
hostility toward the sincere religious beliefs that motivated his objection.”
53
  
Further, the commission’s disparate treatment of similar claims also signaled 
“disapproval” of the baker’s religious beliefs: the commission had found 
lawful other bakers’ refusals to create cakes that disparaged gay marriage.
54
  
In sum, such “hostility was inconsistent with the First Amendment’s 
guarantee that our laws be applied in a manner that is neutral toward 
religion.”
55
 
But in the government funding context, “there are some state actions 
permitted by the Establishment Clause but not required by the Free Exercise 
Clause.”
56
  Accordingly, there is no free exercise violation where the 
government does not make funding recipients “choose between their 
religious beliefs and receiving a government benefit.”
57
  In Locke v. Davey, 
the Court held that a state scholarship program that prohibited recipients 
from pursuing a devotional theology degree did not violate the Free Exercise 
Clause.
58
  First, the Court noted that “the State could, consistent with the 
Federal Constitution, permit [scholarship recipients] to pursue a degree in 
devotional theology,” but the issue was whether the state’s denial of funds for 
that purpose, pursuant to its more restrictive antiestablishment constitutional 
provisions, violated the Free Exercise Clause.
59
 
The Court then concluded that, while the program was not facially 
neutral towards religion, it did not “suggest[ ] animus towards religion,” as it 
allowed students to attend “pervasively religious” institutions as well as enroll 
in theology courses.
60
  Further, qualifying scholarship recipients did not have 
to forego the funds, as they remained free to “use their scholarship to pursue 
a secular degree at a different institution from where they are studying 
 
 51 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1724 (2018). 
 52 Id. 
 53 Id. at 1729. 
 54 Id. at 1731. 
 55 Id. at 1732. 
 56 Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 719 (2004). 
 57 Id. at 720–21. 
 58 Id. at 715. 
 59 Id. at 719. 
 60 Id. at 720, 724–25. 
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devotional theology.”
61
  In short, “[t]he State ha[d] merely chosen not to fund 
a distinct category of instruction.”
62
 
B.  State “No-Aid Provisions” 
As seen above in Witters and Locke, state constitutions often contain 
establishment clause provisions that are more restrictive than the federal 
counterpart.  In fact, only about ten states have establishment clause 
provisions with language that parallels the federal Establishment Clause.
63
  
The remainder typically have language that restricts state aid to religious 
entities to varying degrees.  For the purposes of this paper, such provisions 
will collectively be referred to as “no-aid provisions.”  The two most relevant 
provisions are state “Blaine Amendments” and “compelled support 
provisions.”
64
 
1.  Blaine Amendments 
State Blaine Amendments are “named” after the failed federal 
amendment proposed by House Representative James G. Blaine in 1876.
65
  
Various commentators have noted that the federal Blaine Amendment arose 
out of distinct anti-Catholic animus, after Catholic immigrants had 
increasingly obtained government support and funding for sectarian schools 
in the mid-nineteenth century.
66
  Accordingly, Blaine’s proposed amendment 
specifically sought to curtail sectarian influence in education funding, stating: 
[N]o money raised by taxation in any State for the support of public schools, 
or derived from any public fund therefor, nor any public lands devoted 
thereto, shall ever be under the control of any religious sect; nor shall any 
money so raised or lands so devoted be divided between religious sects or 
 
 61 Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 721 n.4 (2004). 
 62 Id. at 721. 
 63 James N.G. Cauthen, Referenda, Initiatives, and State Constitutional No-Aid Clauses, 76 ALB. L. 
REV. 2141, 2145 & n.21 (2013). 
 64 Jill Goldenziel, Blaine’s Name in Vain?: State Constitutions, School Choice, and Charitable 
Choice, 83 DENV. U. L. REV. 57, 63 (2005); see also Luke A. Lantta, The Post-Zelman Voucher 
Battleground: Where to Turn After Federal Challenges to Blaine Amendments Fail, 67 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 213, 214, 229 (2004). 
 65 Goldenziel, supra note 64, at 63. 
 66 Id.; see also Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 828 (2000) (plurality opinion) (“Opposition to aid to 
‘sectarian’ schools acquired prominence in the 1870’s with Congress’ consideration (and near 
passage) of the Blaine Amendment, which would have amended the Constitution to bar any aid to 
sectarian institutions.  Consideration of the amendment arose at a time of pervasive hostility to the 
Catholic Church and to Catholics in general, and it was an open secret that ‘sectarian’ was code for 
‘Catholic.’”); Cauthen, supra note 63, at 2147; Kyle Duncan, Secularism’s Laws: State Blaine 
Amendments and Religious Persecution, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 493, 495 (2003); Mark Edward 
DeForrest, An Overview and Evaluation of State Blaine Amendments: Origins, Scope, and First 
Amendment Concerns, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 551, 558–65 (2003); Lantta, supra note 64, at 
215–18. 
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denominations.
67
  
However, despite the anti-Catholic narrative associated with the Blaine 
Amendment, some scholars dispute the degree to which such animus 
existed, as well as the influence of the federal amendment on similar state 
provisions.  At least fifteen states had enacted restrictions on funding to 
parochial schools prior to the debates surrounding the Blaine Amendment.
68
  
Further, several of these states were largely devoid of “significant conflicts 
over parochial school funding at the time.”
69
  However, over twenty states 
enacted Blaine Amendments in the period following the federal 
constitutional debate and in the early twentieth century.
70
 
Contemporary definitions of state Blaine Amendments vary.
71
  Some 
commentators use the term to describe constitutional provisions that, like the 
original Blaine Amendment, only expressly prohibit government funding to 
religious schools.
72
  Others include provisions that preclude funding to 
religious entities generally.
73
  Regardless of the particulars, at least thirty-eight 
states have constitutional provisions that restrict government aid to religious 
entities at least to some degree.
74
 
State Blaine Amendments also vary considerably in their application, 
ranging from restrictive to permissive.  Restrictive amendments, like 
Michigan’s express prohibition on school vouchers,
75
 often prohibit indirect 
(e.g., “independent choice” aid) in addition to direct government aid, while 
permissive provisions are generally limited to direct aid and are also 
 
 67 Goldenziel, supra note 64, at 64. 
 68 Cauthen, supra note 63, at 2147. 
 69 Steven K. Green, The Insignificance of the Blaine Amendment, 2008 BYU L. REV. 295, 313 
(“The Michigan Constitution served as an example for similar no-funding constitutional provisions 
in Wisconsin (1848), Indiana (1851), Ohio (1851), and Minnesota (1857).”).  But see Laycock, 
supra note 9, at 166–67 (“If a state’s Blaine provision results in facial discrimination between 
religious and secular private education, then motive should not matter after Trinity Lutheran.  Such 
‘express discrimination’ is unconstitutional without regard to motive.  This may reduce the stakes of 
the debate over motive.”). 
 70 Green, supra note 69, at 327 (“[T]wenty-one states adopted their provisions between 1876—the year 
of the debate over the Blaine Amendment—and 1911—the year marking the admission of New 
Mexico, the last state admitted before a fifty-year hiatus broken by Alaska and Hawaii.”). 
 71 Goldenziel, supra note 64, at 68 (“Scholars disagree over the definition of a Blaine Amendment.”). 
 72 Lantta, supra note 64, at 226–27. 
 73 Duncan, supra note 66, at 515 (“For my purposes, a State Blaine means a state constitutional 
provision that bars persons’ and organizations’ access to public benefits explicitly because they are 
religious persons or organizations.  This is a broad definition . . . . For instance, some bar equal 
participation in public aid only to religious schools; others bar religious organizations or institutions; 
yet others bar non-public institutions generally, while explicitly including religious institutions in that 
category.”). 
 74 See Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2037 & n.10 (2017) 
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (noting that “[t]oday, thirty-eight States have a counterpart to Missouri’s 
[no-aid provision]” and listing no-aid provisions); Green, supra note 69, at 327. 
 75 MICH. CONST. art. VIII, § 2; see also Goldenziel, supra note 64, at 82. 
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supported by lenient judicial interpretations.
76
  For example, New York’s no-
aid provision is actually titled the “Blaine Amendment.”  But despite this 
ominous moniker, New York courts have interpreted the provision’s facially 
restrictive prohibition on “indirect” aid to mean indirectly establishing or 
advancing religion.
77
  However, roughly seventeen states’ no-aid provisions 
fall into the restrictive or strict category.
78
 
2.  Compelled Support Clauses 
Compelled support clauses have similarly been construed to restrict 
government aid to religious entities.  Such provisions are found in twenty-
nine state constitutions and generally preclude taxpayers from being forced 
to financially support religious institutions.
79
  “[S]tate courts generally have 
not interpreted compelled support clauses to place any greater restrictions 
on government than those imposed under the First Amendment,”
80
 but 
Vermont in particular has used a compelled support provision to prohibit a 
school choice program.
81
  Further, no-funding provisions are also found 
within or following compelled support clauses and have been interpreted 
together with them.
82
 
II.  TRINITY LUTHERAN 
Trinity Lutheran Church operates a Child Learning Center, which 
provides daycare and preschool services on a nondiscriminatory basis to the 
Boone County, Missouri community at large.
83
  The Church expressly 
includes the Learning Center as one of its religious ministries, and includes 
“developmentally appropriate” religious instruction in its programs.
84
  The 
Learning Center also has a well-equipped playground, albeit with an 
“unforgiving” pea gravel surface, used by both Center students and other 
 
 76 Lantta, supra note 64, at 226–27; see also Frank R. Kemerer, The Constitutional Dimension of 
School Vouchers, 3 TEX. F. ON C.L. & C.R. 137, 172 (1998). 
 77 Lantta, supra note 64, at 240. 
 78 Id. at 227. 
 79 Cauthen, supra note 63, at 2145; Goldenziel, supra note 64, at 64–65. 
 80 Cauthen, supra note 63, at 2145. 
 81 Chittenden Town Sch. Dist. v. Dep’t of Educ., 738 A.2d 539, 562–63 (Vt. 1999); see also 
Goldenziel, supra note 64, at 65. 
 82 See MICH. CONST. art. I, § 4 (“No person shall be compelled to attend, or, against his consent, to 
contribute to the erection or support of any place of religious worship, or to pay tithes, taxes or 
other rates for the support of any minister of the gospel or teacher of religion.  No money shall be 
appropriated or drawn from the treasury for the benefit of any religious sect or society, theological 
or religious seminary; nor shall property belonging to the state be appropriated for any such 
purpose.”); Am. Atheists, Inc. v. City of Detroit Downtown Dev. Auth., 567 F.3d 278, 301 (6th Cir. 
2009). 
 83 Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2017 (2017). 
 84 Id. at 2027–28 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
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children in the local community.
85
 
The Missouri Department of Natural Resources ran a Scrap Tire 
Program providing reimbursement grants on a competitive basis to qualifying 
organizations that installed rubber surfaces made from recycled tires.
86
  The 
Learning Center applied for a grant under the program in 2012, seeking to 
resurface its playground and ameliorate the safety hazards posed by the 
existing pea gravel.
87
  Despite being one of the most competitive candidates,
88
 
the Department denied the Center’s application under its policy that 
categorically excluded “any applicant owned or controlled by a church, sect, 
or other religious entity,”
89
 adopted pursuant to the Missouri constitution’s 
no-aid provision.
90
 
The Church subsequently sued the Department in federal court, 
asserting that the Department’s denial of its grant application violated the 
First Amendment’s Free Exercise, Establishment, and Free Speech Clauses, 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, and the state 
constitution’s no-aid provision.
91
 
Recognizing the more stringent separation of church and state under the 
Missouri Constitution and distinguishing cases where aid was provided to 
institutions that were religiously affiliated but ultimately not controlled by 
religious entities, the district court first determined that awarding a grant to 
the Church would violate the state constitution’s no-aid provision.
92
 
The court then held that the Department’s denial did not violate the Free 
Exercise Clause.  Primarily relying on Locke, the court found that the 
Department had merely excluded the Church from receiving an affirmative 
benefit and as such did not target religious practice.  Further, the 
government’s significant antiestablishment interest outweighed the relatively 
minor burden on the Church.
93
  Moreover, the court concluded that since 
the Department, consistent with the Establishment Clause, could provide 
grants to the Church, a possible Establishment Clause violation was “not at 
 
 85 Id. at 2017–18 (majority opinion). 
 86 Id. at 2017. 
 87 Id. 
 88 Id. at 2018 (“The Center ranked fifth among the 44 applicants in the 2012 Scrap Tire Program.”). 
 89 Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2017 (2017). 
 90 See MO. CONST. art. I, § 7 (“[N]o money shall ever be taken from the public treasury, directly or 
indirectly, in aid of any church, sect or denomination of religion, or in aid of any priest, preacher, 
minister or teacher thereof, as such; and that no preference shall be given to nor any discrimination 
made against any church, sect or creed of religion, or any form of religious faith or worship.”). 
 91 Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Pauley, 976 F. Supp. 2d 1137, 1140 (W.D. Mo. 
2013), aff’d, 788 F.3d 779 (8th Cir. 2015), rev’d and remanded sub nom. Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. 
Ct. 2012.  As the Supreme Court did not reach the merits of the Church’s Equal Protection or Free 
Speech claims, the lower court’s reasoning as to those claims is omitted from this background 
discussion. 
 92 Id. at 1141–45. 
 93 Id. at 1146–51. 
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issue in this case.”
94
 
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit similarly rejected the Church’s federal and 
state constitutional claims and affirmed the judgment.
95
  The court again 
recognized that “Missouri could include the Learning Center’s playground in 
a non-discriminatory Scrap Tire grant program without violating the 
Establishment Clause,” but that the issue was “whether the Free Exercise 
Clause [or] the Establishment Clause . . . compel Missouri to provide public 
grant money directly to a church, contravening a long-standing state 
constitutional provision that is not unique to Missouri.”
96
  Finding that “[n]o 
Supreme Court case . . . has granted such relief,” the court noted that “only 
the Supreme Court [could] make that leap,” again relying on Locke to hold 
that the state no-aid provision did not conflict with the federal Religion 
Clauses.
97
 
The Supreme Court, in a 7–2 decision, reversed.  Consistent with the 
lower court decisions, the Court first conceded that “[t]he parties agree that 
the Establishment Clause of th[e First] Amendment does not prevent 
Missouri from including Trinity Lutheran in the Scrap Tire Program.”
98
  
Proceeding to the Church’s free exercise claim, Chief Justice Roberts, writing 
for the majority, noted that “[t]he Free Exercise Clause ‘protect[s] religious 
observers against unequal treatment’ and subjects to the strictest scrutiny laws 
that target the religious for ‘special disabilities’ based on their ‘religious 
status.’”
99
 
Analogizing to McDaniel and Sherbert, the majority found that the 
Department’s categorical exclusion of the Center from the grant program 
effectively imposed a penalty on the Church and other religious entities 
“solely because of their religious character.”
100
  Roberts then distinguished 
Locke by indicating that Washington state had “merely chosen not to fund a 
distinct category of instruction” and that the claimant there “was not denied a 
scholarship because of who he was; he was denied a scholarship because of 
what he proposed to do—use the funds to prepare for the ministry.”101  In 
contrast, here, the Church “was denied a grant simply because of what it is—a 
church.”
102
 
Further, the Department’s antiestablishment interest was not analogous 
to the state of Washington’s in Locke since clergy training was an “essentially 
 
 94 Id. at 1151. 
 95 Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Pauley, 788 F.3d 779, 790 (8th Cir. 2015). 
 96 Id. at 784.  
 97 Id. at 784–85. 
 98 Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2019 (2017). 
 99 Id. at 2019 (quoting Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533, 542 (1993) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 100 Id. at 2021–22. 
 101 Id. at 2023 (internal citations omitted). 
 102 Id. 
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religious endeavor” and clearly distinct from playground resurfacing in this 
case.
103
  In addition, the Locke Court only reached the state’s 
antiestablishment interest after determining that the state program there “did 
not require students to choose between their religious beliefs and receiving a 
government benefit.”
104
  Here, the majority found that the Church essentially 
had to choose between the two.
105
  Since the Department’s antiestablishment 
interest was not “compelling,” the Court found that its policy violated the 
Church’s free exercise rights, emphatically stating that “the exclusion of 
Trinity Lutheran from a public benefit for which it is otherwise qualified, 
solely because it is a church, is odious to our Constitution all the same, and 
cannot stand.”
106
  However, Roberts, joined by a plurality of Justices, 
attempted to limit the reach of the decision in footnote three to the majority 
opinion: “This case involves express discrimination based on religious 
identity with respect to playground resurfacing.  We do not address religious 
uses of funding or other forms of discrimination.”
107
 
Justices Gorsuch and Thomas each concurred in part but declined to 
join footnote three.  Thomas expressed concern with “[t]his Court’s 
endorsement in Locke of even a ‘mil[d] kind’ of discrimination against 
religion,” but agreed with the majority’s narrow interpretation of the case.
108
  
Gorsuch questioned the majority’s distinction from Locke between 
“discriminat[ion] on the basis of religious status and religious use,” 
specifically noting that, it shouldn’t “matter whether we describe [a] benefit, 
say, as closed to Lutherans (status) or closed to people who do Lutheran 
things (use).  It is free exercise either way.”
109
  Accordingly, free exercise 
principles “do not permit discrimination against religious exercise—whether 
on the playground or anywhere else.”
110
 
Justice Breyer concurred in the judgment, specifically reasoning that the 
Scrap Tire Program—due to its focus on child health and safety—was more 
properly characterized not as a mere public benefit, but more akin to public 
welfare.
111
  In that sense, precluding the Church from the program would be 
analogous to cutting it off from such “general government services as 
 
 103 Id.  
 104 Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2023 (2017) (internal 
quotations omitted). 
 105 Id. at 2024 (“In this case, there is no dispute that Trinity Lutheran is put to the choice between 
being a church and receiving a government benefit.”). 
 106 Id. at 2025. 
 107 Id. at 2024 n.3 (plurality). Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion was joined in full by Justices Kennedy, 
Alito, and Kagan. Justices Thomas and Gorsuch joined except as to footnote three, and Justice 
Breyer concurred in the judgment only. Justices Sotomayor and Ginsburg dissented.  Id. at 2016 
(majority opinion). 
 108 Id. at 2025 (Thomas, J., concurring) (second alteration in original) (internal citations omitted). 
 109 Id. at 2025–26 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (emphasis in original). 
 110 Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2026 (2017). 
 111 Id. at 2026–27 (Breyer, J., concurring in judgment). 
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ordinary police and fire protection” that the Everson Court stated churches 
and religious institutions were clearly entitled to receive.
112
 
In an impassioned dissent, Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justice Ginsberg, 
first argued that, contrary to the assertions of the parties, providing direct 
funding to the Church would violate the Establishment Clause.
113
  Noting the 
inherently religious mission of the Learning Center, Sotomayor found that 
direct program grants would impermissibly advance religion, as “[t]he 
playground surface cannot be confined to secular use any more than lumber 
used to frame the Church’s walls, glass stained and used to form its windows, 
or nails used to build its altar.”
114
 
Even absent an Establishment Clause violation, Justice Sotomayor 
concluded that the interplay between the Religion Clauses often requires the 
government to “draw lines based on an entity’s religious ‘status.’”
115
  After 
providing a substantive historical discussion of state opposition to public 
funding of religious entities, she argued that the Locke decision recognized 
this historic state interest.
116
 
Further, Justice Sotomayor contended that since the Establishment 
Clause prohibits government from funding religious activities, “[a] state can 
reasonably use status as a ‘house of worship’ as a stand-in for ‘religious 
activities.’”
117
  Also noting that “thirty-eight states have a counterpart to 
Missouri’s [no-aid provision],”
118
 she concluded by expressing concern that 
the majority’s decision “holds not just that a government may support houses 
of worship with taxpayer funds, but that—at least in this case and perhaps in 
others—it must do so whenever it decides to create a funding program.”
119
  
III.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Legal Perspectives on Trinity Lutheran 
At first, what may be most striking about the decision is the complete 
absence of analysis on the Establishment Clause issue.  Chief Justice 
Roberts’ omission is no doubt a flaw in the majority opinion.  However, it is 
ultimately a minor one.  Despite Justice Sotomayor’s vigorous argument, 
including Trinity Lutheran in the Scrap Tire Program likely does not violate 
 
 112 Id. at 2027 (quoting Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1947)). 
 113 Id. at 2028–29 (2017) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“The government may not directly fund religious 
exercise. . . . Nowhere is this rule more clearly implicated than when funds flow directly from the 
public treasury to a house of worship.”). 
 114 Id. at 2030. 
 115 Id. at 2031. 
 116 Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2036 (2017). 
 117 Id. 
 118 Id. at 2037.  
 119 Id. at 2041 (internal citation omitted). 
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the Establishment Clause.  Sotomayor is entirely correct in recognizing that 
“[c]onstitutional questions are decided by this Court, not the parties’ 
concessions.”
120
  But, her Establishment Clause analysis effectively ignores the 
Court’s recent shift away from categorical prohibitions on aid to “pervasively 
sectarian” institutions.
121
  Resurfacing a gravel playground at a church daycare 
cannot reasonably be interpreted as advancing or endorsing religious 
indoctrination any more than placing public school teachers in pervasively 
sectarian schools could in the program upheld in Agostini.
122
  In prior cases, 
the Court has noted “‘special Establishment Clause dangers,’ when money is 
given to religious schools or entities directly,”
123
 and Justice Sotomayor 
emphasized that Trinity Lutheran had provided no “assurances that public 
funds would not be used for religious activity.”
124
  However, since the Scrap 
Tire Program only provides one-time reimbursement grants for playground 
resurfacing costs, the state can easily verify and ensure secular use of the 
funds.
125
 
The majority opinion’s free exercise analysis, in contrast, fails in several 
respects.  Despite Chief Justice Roberts’ attempt to limit the reach of the 
decision, footnote three is unlikely to have that practical effect.  The footnote 
only garnered a plurality of Justices, leaving courts and future litigants to 
likely rely on the opinion’s sweeping pronouncements.
126
 
More importantly, Roberts’ interpretation of free exercise precedent 
does not support his opinion’s far-reaching “nondiscrimination” principle.
127
  
He and the majority ultimately rejected the government’s antiestablishment 
interest as not compelling enough in concluding that the Department’s 
exclusion of religious entities from the Scrap Tire Program constituted 
 
 120 Id. at 2028. 
 121 Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 826–28 (2000) (plurality opinion). 
 122 Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 228, 234–35 (1997).  
 123 Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 818–19 (internal citation omitted) (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors 
of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 842 (1995)). 
 124 Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2029. 
 125 Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 688 (1971) (noting that the construction grants for secular 
facilities at religious colleges at issue were a one-time payment and thus “no government analysis of 
an institution’s expenditures on secular as distinguished from religious activities” would be 
required). 
 126 Aside from only commanding a plurality, the footnote may have been a mere compromise to 
secure the majority’s result, and, in particular, Justice Breyer’s vote.  Gillian E. Metzger, Foreword, 
1930s Redux: The Administrative State Under Siege, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1, 29 (2017).  However, 
despite their separate opinions, it is not unreasonable to speculate that Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, 
and Ginsburg would likely agree with footnote 3’s limiting principle, which may lend more support 
for its future importance.  Frank Ravitch, Symposium: Trinity Lutheran and Zelman—Saved by 
Footnote 3 or a Dream Come True for Voucher Advocates?, SCOTUSBLOG (June 26, 2017, 
10:59 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/06/symposium-trinity-lutheran-church-v-comer-
zelman-v-simmons-harris-saved-footnote-3-dream-come-true-voucher-advocates/. 
 127 Edward Correia, Trinity Lutheran Church v. Comer: An Unfortunate New Anti-Discrimination 
Principle, 18 RUTGERS J.L. & RELIGION 280, 290–92 (2017). 
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“discrimination” on the basis of religious status.  However, the compelling 
government interest requirement under Sherbert and McDaniel—the free 
exercise government aid cases most analogous to the facts in Trinity 
Lutheran—was effectively abrogated by Smith as to neutral and generally 
applicable government action.
128
 
The majority opinion did note that the program was generally applicable, 
but maintained it was not neutral as it expressly referenced religion.
129
  But, 
under Locke, which Roberts fervently distinguished but ultimately upheld, a 
policy’s lack of facial neutrality as to religion does not automatically trigger 
strict scrutiny review.
130
  Instead, Locke clarifies Lukumi’s neutrality 
requirement in the context of government aid to religious organizations: a 
program is not neutral if it demonstrates “animus” or “hostility” towards 
religion.
131
  The animus in Lukumi was clear: the city government specifically 
targeted the Santería religion because it disapproved of its religious practices.  
Likewise, the state commission in Masterpiece Cakeshop was similarly 
hostile and disapproving of the baker’s religious views on gay marriage in his 
decision to refuse service at his business.
132
  Missouri’s desire to avoid 
violating the Constitution is not nearly of the same ilk. 
Accordingly, “discrimination” on the basis of religious status that triggers 
strict scrutiny review should be accompanied by demonstrable animus or 
hostility towards religion.  Although the case was decided after Trinity 
Lutheran, the Masterpiece Cakeshop decision supports the principle that 
such hostility should reflect palpable state disapproval of religious belief.
133
  
Unfortunately, the Court has increasingly considered a mere lack of 
neutrality between secular and religious institutions in the provision of 
 
 128 See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 513 (1997) (“In evaluating the claim [in Smith], we 
declined to apply the balancing test set forth in Sherbert v. Verner, under which we would have 
asked whether Oregon’s prohibition substantially burdened a religious practice and, if it did, 
whether the burden was justified by a compelling government interest.” (internal citation omitted)); 
Ruiz-Diaz v. United States, 703 F.3d 483, 486 (9th Cir. 2012) (“The Supreme Court in 
Employment Division v. Smith overruled Sherbert and [Wisconsin v.] Yoder.” (internal citations 
omitted)); see Correia, supra note 127, at 292 (arguing that McDaniel is the case “closest to the 
broad proposition the Court claims,” but “the Court’s authority for the ‘highest order’ test [in 
McDaniel] comes from a case that has been clearly rejected if not overruled outright”). 
 129 Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2024 (2017). 
 130 Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 720 (2004) (“[Petitioner] contends that under the rule we 
enunciated in Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, the program is presumptively 
unconstitutional because it is not facially neutral with respect to religion.  We reject his claim of 
presumptive unconstitutionality, however; to do otherwise would extend the Lukumi line of cases 
well beyond not only their facts but their reasoning.” (internal citation and footnote omitted)).  
 131 See id. at 725 (“[W]e find neither in the history or text of [the state no-aid provision], nor in the 
operation of the Promise Scholarship Program, anything that suggests animus toward religion.”); 
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533 (1993) (“[I]f the 
object of a law is to infringe upon or restrict practices because of their religious motivation, the law 
is not neutral.”). 
 132 Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1729–30, 1732 (2018). 
 133 Id. 
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government benefits as demonstrating “hostility” towards religion,
134
 despite 
rational justifications for the exclusion of religious entities from government 
aid programs.  This understanding of discrimination oversimplifies Lukumi’s 
formulation, where for discrimination to be constitutionally suspect, it must 
be rooted in the “targeting,” “suppression,”
135
 or “disfavor of religion.”
136
  The 
Court has repeatedly recognized that government distinctions based on 
religious status are often necessary because of the interactions between the 
Religion Clauses.
137
 
B.  Normative Perspectives on Trinity Lutheran 
From a normative perspective, the result in Trinity Lutheran is probably 
the “right” one.  After all, this is also a case about “scraped knees” on 
neighborhood playgrounds.
138
  The Learning Center was likely the most 
deserving grant recipient in Boone County, Missouri.  It ranked fifth out of 
all applicants.  Its playground was public and not only served its 
approximately ninety students, but also children from the entire 
community.
139
  The program’s goals of increasing child safety on playgrounds 
while reducing scrap tire waste in landfills would not be as adequately 
fulfilled if the Missouri Department of Resources didn’t replace the Learning 
Center’s “unforgiving” pea gravel playground surface.
140
 
 
 134 See Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2025 (“[T]he exclusion of Trinity Lutheran from a public 
benefit for which it is otherwise qualified, solely because it is a church, is odious to our Constitution 
all the same, and cannot stand.” (emphasis added)); Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 828 (2000) 
(plurality opinion) (“[H]ostility to aid to pervasively sectarian schools has a shameful pedigree that 
we do not hesitate to disavow.”); Frank S. Ravitch, The Supreme Court’s Rhetorical Hostility: 
What Is “Hostile” to Religion Under the Establishment Clause?, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1031, 1034 
(“[T]he Court (or a plurality of Justices) has in essence said that failure to treat religious entities and 
individuals like all other entities and individuals is hostile toward religion.  Thus, the Court seems 
poised to treat hostility and lack of formal neutrality as two sides of the same coin.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
 135 Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 533. 
 136 Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 720 (2004) (“In the present case, the State’s disfavor of religion (if it 
can be called that) is of a far milder kind.  It imposes neither criminal nor civil sanctions on any 
type of religious service or rite.  It does not deny to ministers the right to participate in the political 
affairs of the community.”). 
 137 See Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2040 (2017) 
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“A State’s decision not to fund houses of worship does not disfavor 
religion; rather, it represents a valid choice to remain secular in the face of serious establishment 
and free exercise concerns.  That does not make the State ‘atheistic or antireligious.’” (quoting 
County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 610 (1989)); Correia, supra note 127, at 294 (“There 
will always be an element of ‘discrimination’ in the treatment of religious and non-religious activities 
and organizations as long as the Establishment Clause has any meaning.”). 
 138 Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2025 (majority opinion). 
 139 Steven D. Schwinn, Can a State Exclude a Church from an Otherwise Neutral and Secular Grant 
Program Just Because It Is a Church?: Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia v. Comer (Docket 
No. 15-577), 44 PREVIEW U.S. SUP. CT. CAS. 214, 214 (2017). 
 140 Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2017. 
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But the boundless principles on religious “discrimination” the majority 
opinion invokes to resolve the issue are deeply troubling.  The majority’s 
adherence to an austere, formalistic conception of neutrality and 
nondiscrimination in government funding fails to account for the unique 
status that houses of worship occupy in our legal and social framework.  The 
Free Exercise Clause requires a certain degree of government 
noninterference in church affairs: a “special solitude” that is distinct and 
exceeds similar “secular” constitutional protections, such as the freedom of 
association.
141
  As such, the government cannot, among other things, judicially 
resolve certain church property disputes or require houses of worship to 
comply with employment discrimination statutes in the selection of clergy.
142
 
Until Trinity Lutheran of course, accommodations affirmatively required 
by the Free Exercise Clause were few.  Instead, where there is no 
Establishment Clause violation, federal and state governments have extended 
substantial accommodations to religious entities as a matter of legislative 
grace rooted in the noninterference principle.
143
  Such discretionary 
accommodations can properly be considered “benefits.”
144
  Many of these 
accommodations are not granted to similar, secular organizations.  For 
instance, houses of worship may discriminate on the basis of religion in all 
employment decisions
145
 and enjoy additional federal tax exemptions over 
secular nonprofits.
146
  And here, these discretionary benefits only need to be 
 
 141 Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 189 (2012). 
 142 Id. at 188–90; Presbyterian Church in the United States v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l 
Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969) (“[T]he First Amendment severely circumscribes 
the role that civil courts may play in resolving church property disputes.”).  
 143 Real Alternatives, Inc. v. Sec’y Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 867 F.3d 338, 352 (3d Cir. 2017) 
(citing Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 720–22 (2005)). 
 144 Kevin L. Brady, Comment, Religious Sincerity and Imperfection: Can Lapsing Prisoners Recover 
Under RFRA and RLUIPA?, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 1431, 1455 (2011) (“Religious accommodations 
often provide benefits solely to sincere adherents.”). 
 145 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (2012); Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day 
Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 338 (1987) (“Where . . . government acts with the proper purpose of 
lifting a regulation that burdens the exercise of religion, we see no reason to require that the 
exemption come packaged with benefits to secular entities.”).  
 146 Religious entities and secular nonprofits are both eligible for federal tax exemption.  See 26 U.S.C. 
§ 501(c)(3) (2012) (authorizing non-profit exemption from federal taxes).  However, houses of 
worship (and in some cases their auxiliary organizations) do not have to apply for recognition of the 
exemption or file an annual information return (returns are open to public inspection).  See id. 
§ 508(c)(1) (showing that houses of worship are exempt from the need to file a 501(c)(3)); id. 
§ 6033(a)–(b) (exempting religious organizations from annual information returns).  Nor are they 
presumed to be private foundations, exempting them from additional regulations and special taxes.  
See id. § 508(b), (c)(1)(A) (outlining the special existence of religious entities as exempt from 
private foundation taxes).  They are generally not subject to audit, and do not have to pay 
employment taxes or comply with certain retirement plan requirements for their ministers.  See id. 
§ 7611(a)(1), (2) (exempting religious entities from audit); id. § 3309(b)(1)–(2), 414(e) (showing that 
religious entities as employers are exempt from employment taxes and retirement plan 
requirements); see also W. COLE DURHAM AND ROBERT SMITH, 4 RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS 
AND THE LAW § 32:6 (Westlaw rev. ed. 2017) (summarizing the tax exemptions that religious 
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distributed neutrally among religions to comport with the Establishment and 
Equal Protection Clauses, despite the lack of neutrality between religious and 
secular entities.
147
 
Accordingly, the Trinity Lutheran decision essentially allows houses of 
worship and religious organizations to “double-dip” in benefits and 
accommodations.
148
  It allows state governments to extend discretionary 
benefits solely to religious entities under a less stringent concept of neutrality 
while simultaneously requiring state governments to include them in 
discretionary funding programs extended to secular entities under a higher 
neutrality standard.  This inconsistency undermines neutrality overall by 
prioritizing religious “status,” cripples the “play in the joints” in the Religion 
Clauses where the legislature may allocate assistance according to political 
preferences, and appears fundamentally at odds with common-sense notions 
of fairness.  
Moreover, the majority’s conclusion that arguably benign exclusions of 
religious entities from government funding programs constitute “odious” 
status discrimination may raise equal protection concerns where the 
government seeks to accommodate religion.  For example, state action based 
on racial status is subject to strict scrutiny review regardless of whether it 
burdens or benefits individuals in the class.
149
  In contrast, religious 
accommodations are typically only subject to a far less rigorous 
Establishment Clause analysis.
150
  If, according to the Trinity Lutheran 
majority, strict scrutiny applies whenever government restricts religious 
participation in government funding programs, strict scrutiny should likewise 
apply when the government extends discretionary benefits exclusively to 
religious entities.  A heightened standard of review may threaten a host of 
 
entities enjoy).  Additionally, ministers themselves receive various exemptions under the tax code.  
See id.  § 107 (outlining the ministerial exemptions in the tax code). 
 147 Amos, 483 U.S. at 338–39 (“Appellees argue that [the religious discrimination exemption under 
Title VII] offends equal protection principles by giving less protection to the employees of religious 
employers than to the employees of secular employers. . . . But . . . laws discriminating among 
religions are subject to strict scrutiny, and . . . laws ‘affording a uniform benefit to all religions’ 
should be analyzed under Lemon.” (internal citations omitted)). 
 148 See Ira C. Lupu, Government Messages and Government Money: Santa Fe, Mitchell v. Helms, 
and the Arc of the Establishment Clause, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 771, 820 (2001) (“[T]he 
absence of a religious nondiscrimination requirement in hiring might be seen as double-dipping by 
religious institutions, which rely on their sectarian character in their quest for autonomy in selecting 
employees while simultaneously seeking a place as a religion-neutral dispenser of government 
benefits.”); Laura B. Mutterperl, Note, Employment at (God’s) Will: The Constitutionality of 
Antidiscrimination Exemptions in Charitable Choice Legislation, 37 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 389, 
432–33 (2002). 
 149 See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 223–24 (1995) (under “consistency” 
principle, holding that all race-based classifications are subject to strict scrutiny regardless of “the 
race of those burdened or benefited by a particular classification” (quoting City of Richmond v. J.A. 
Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 494 (1989))). 
 150 Amos, 483 U.S. at 338–39. 
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permissible religious accommodations.  For instance, historical 
noninterference in church affairs may be a compelling government interest 
in upholding exemptions from federal tax audits and reporting requirements 
for houses of worship,
151
 but the breadth of the exemption is likely not 
narrowly tailored.  There are likely less restrictive means to avoid substantial 
interference in religious affairs while still subjecting churches to similar tax 
requirements as secular nonprofits.  For one, church financial records could 
be reviewed as a matter of course “to the extent necessary to determine the 
liability for, and the amount of, any tax”—the Internal Revenue Service is 
already authorized to do when it reasonably believes a church claiming an 
exemption is not a bona fide church.
152
 
In either event, the Trinity Lutheran decision may be a double-edged 
sword.  On the one hand, religious entities may now be able to participate in 
a wide swath of government funding programs previously foreclosed to them.  
On the other hand, government funding is a finite resource, and increased 
program participation likewise increases the strain on those resources.  
Constitutionally mandated inclusion of religious entities may thus have a 
chilling effect on social welfare programs.  Legislatures may reduce the 
amount of benefits under existing funding programs and decline to offer new 
ones due to budget constraints.  The force of Chief Justice Roberts’ footnote 
three is likely insufficient to tackle these externalities and social costs.
153
 
Further, government funding routinely comes with strings attached.  The 
government constitutionally cannot “giv[e] significant aid to institutions that 
practice racial or other invidious discrimination,”
154
 and funding programs 
often require nondiscrimination in hiring and provision of services for 
eligibility.  In contrast, houses of worship are expressly permitted to 
discriminate on religious grounds under federal law and various state public 
accommodations statutes.
155
  Such neutral and generally applicable 
nondiscrimination conditions to funding as applied to religious entities likely 
do not violate the Free Exercise Clause
156
 or the unconstitutional conditions 
 
 151 See John W. Whitehead, Tax Exemption and Churches: A Historical and Constitutional Analysis, 
22 CUMB. L. REV. 521, 545–55 (1992) (detailing the history of tax exemptions for churches). 
 152 26 U.S.C. § 7611(a)(2), (b)(1)(A) (2012). 
 153 See Ira C. Lupu, Uncovering the Village of Kiryas Joel, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 104, 115 (1996) 
(“Religious accommodations usually create externalities, in the sense that such accommodations 
permit behavior which the polity would otherwise forbid; because the underlying prohibition 
usually has social benefits, accommodations generate corresponding social costs.”). 
 154 Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 467 (1973). 
 155 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (2012); Kelly Catherine Chapman, Gay Rights, the Bible, and Public 
Accommodations: An Empirical Approach to Religious Exemptions for Holdout States, 100 GEO. 
L.J. 1783, 1789 (2012) (noting at least twenty-two jurisdictions with public accommodations statutes 
that prohibit sexual orientation discrimination, with most including at least “minimal” exemptions 
for houses of worship). 
 156 See Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990) (describing the Free Exercise Clause and noting 
that the government “may not compel affirmation of religious belief”).  
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doctrine,
157
 but nonetheless clash with principles of noninterference.  Of 
course, these entities always have recourse to simply decline the funds.
158
  But 
the resulting conflict is clear where religious entities seek to exercise their 
“right” to funding under Trinity Lutheran.159 
C.  Implications for State No-Aid Provisions 
The Trinity Lutheran decision has sparked ample attention as to its 
implications for government funding programs going forward.  Some 
commentators have expressed concern that the decision effectively creates a 
new free exercise principle: “that the government is constitutionally required 
to provide assistance to religious institutions.”
160
  Others have contrarily 
argued that the decision is “long overdue,” and correctly extends the Free 
Exercise Clause principle against discrimination based on religious status to 
government benefits.
161
  Arguably most significantly, commentators on both 
sides have noted that the decision calls into doubt the viability of state no-aid 
provisions found in the majority of state constitutions.
162
 
However, Trinity Lutheran’s implications for state Blaine Amendments 
and similar constitutional provisions that prohibit government funding to 
religious entities are likely not as far reaching as commentators have claimed 
and, more importantly, should not be interpreted as such.  State no-aid 
provisions likely do not categorically violate the Free Exercise Clause for 
three notable reasons. 
First, state Blaines are largely consistent with the religious status versus 
 
 157 See, e.g., Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 544–46, 549, 551 (1983) 
(holding that tax exemption condition prohibiting lobbying by certain nonprofits was not 
unconstitutional condition because government is “not required . . . to subsidize lobbying”). 
 158 See Agency for Int’l Dev. v. All. for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 570 U.S. 205, 214 (2013) (“As a general 
matter, if a party objects to a condition on the receipt of federal funding, its recourse is to decline 
the funds.  This remains true when the objection is that a condition may affect the recipient’s 
exercise of its First Amendment rights.”); Ibby Caputo & Jon Marcus, The Controversial Reason 
Some Religious Colleges Forgo Federal Funding, ATLANTIC (July 7, 2016), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2016/07/the-controversial-reason-some-religious-
colleges-forgo-federal-funding/490253/ (noting that religious colleges are refusing Title IV and IX 
funding due to conditions prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination). 
 159 See Brief of Amicus Curiae Lambda Legal Defense & Education Fund, Inc. in Support of 
Respondent at 18, Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012 (2017) 
(No. 15–577), 2016 WL 3667051, at *18 (“[N]umerous courts have held that publicly funded 
social service providers are not entitled to religious accommodations that would permit them to 
deliver services in a sectarian or discriminatory manner, which would violate the Establishment 
Clause.”); Richard W. Garnett & Jackson C. Blais, Religious Freedom and Recycled Tires: The 
Meaning and Implications of Trinity Lutheran, 2017 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 105, 127–28. 
 160 Chemerinsky, supra note 4, at 358. 
 161 Garnett & Blais, supra note 159, at 121. 
 162 See, e.g., Erica Smith, Blaine Amendments and the Unconstitutionality of Excluding Religious 
Options from School Choice Programs, 18 FEDERALIST SOC’Y REV. 48, 48, 58 (2017). 
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religious use distinction proposed in Trinity Lutheran.163  Read to its broadest 
conclusion, the Trinity Lutheran decision advances the proposition that any 
government discrimination in generally available funding programs based on 
religious status is the lynchpin of a free exercise violation.
164
  However, the 
majority in Trinity Lutheran explicitly recognized the continuing validity of 
their decision in Locke, which implicitly upheld Washington’s constitutional 
prohibition on the use of public funds for religious instruction as applied to 
its state scholarship program.
165
  Specifically, the Trinity Lutheran majority 
noted that the Locke petitioner “was not denied a scholarship because of 
who he was; he was denied a scholarship because of what he proposed to 
do—use the funds to prepare for the ministry.”166 
State Blaine Amendments can similarly be construed as prohibiting the 
religious use of taxpayer funds rather than excluding churches and religious 
institutions from government funding programs “solely because of their 
religious character.”
167
  The education funding context is particularly 
illustrative.  As noted in Section I.B.1 above, the failed national Blaine 
Amendment was exclusively concerned with education funding.
168
  Today, 
nearly forty states have Blaine Amendments in their constitutions, with the 
vast majority of such amendments dealing primarily with education funding 
to sectarian schools.
169
  Even absent a federal Establishment Clause violation, 
prohibiting the use of public funds to pay for religious instruction at sectarian 
schools is a legitimate government interest.
170
  The Supreme Court has 
repeatedly recognized the fundamental establishment concerns with religious 
indoctrination in the education funding context.
171
  While religious 
 
 163 Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2023. 
 164 Id. at 2025 (“[T]he exclusion of Trinity Lutheran from a public benefit for which it is otherwise 
qualified, solely because it is a church, is odious to our Constitution all the same, and cannot 
stand.”). 
 165 See id. at 2022–23; Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 720–25 (2004) (holding that state scholarship 
program’s prohibition on use of funds for theology degrees did not violate Free Exercise Clause).  
 166 Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2023 (emphasis in original). 
 167 See id. at 2021 (emphasis added). 
 168 See 4 CONG. REC. 205 (1875); see also DeForrest, supra note 66, at 557 (“The second effect of 
Blaine’s amendment would have been to prohibit state governments from supporting private 
religious schools with funds from the public treasury.”). 
 169 See Green, supra note 69, at 327 (“Counts may vary, but thirty-eight states have express provisions 
limiting or prohibiting public funding to religious schools (by whatever name) and/or prohibiting 
control of the education fund by a religious entity.”); Goldenziel, supra note 64, at 69 (“While the 
Federal Blaine Amendment was confined to restrictions of public funding of schools, twenty-one of 
the thirty-nine no-funding provisions restrict funding to all religious institutions or societies, or any 
funding that will be used for a religious purpose.”); see also Meir Katz, The State of Blaine: A 
Closer Look at the Blaine Amendments and Their Modern Application, 12 ENGAGE 111, 111 & 
n.1 (2011) (listing amendments). 
 170 See Locke, 540 U.S. at 722–25 (holding the state had a “substantial” interest in not funding 
theological instruction, even though such funding would be permissible under federal 
Establishment Clause). 
 171 See Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 687 (1971) (upholding direct grants to religiously affiliated 
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instruction at sectarian schools may not be an “essentially religious endeavor” 
to the same degree as the ministerial training sought by the petitioner in 
Locke,172 the implications for funding religious indoctrination are 
undoubtedly related.
173
  
The status versus use distinction is relevant for this very reason. In the 
context of a government benefit funded by taxpayer dollars, it does matter 
“whether we describe that benefit, say, as closed to Lutherans (status) or 
closed to people who do Lutheran things (use).”
174
  Providing funding to a 
Lutheran to educate schoolchildren in religious doctrine, for example, is a 
far cry from providing unemployment benefits to a Lutheran terminated for 
refusing to work on the Sabbath.
175
  The relevant inquiry should include a 
determination of whether funds from the public fisc will invariably be used 
for inherently religious purposes, like instruction and indoctrination.  The 
Trinity Lutheran plurality implicitly recognized this distinction in their 
controversial footnote 3; the free exercise violation largely existed because 
playground resurfacing is not a religious activity.
176
 
Accordingly, state agencies may need to more closely evaluate the nature 
of the aid provided under government programs before—pursuant to more 
restrictive state constitutional provisions—adopting policies that categorically 
exclude religious institutions.  Funding programs that deny qualified religious 
institutions clearly secular aid for clearly secular uses are prime for attack on 
free exercise grounds post-Trinity Lutheran. 
However, in practice, states by and large do not adopt such bright-line 
rules concerning government funding to religious institutions under Blaine 
 
colleges because, inter alia, “religious indoctrination is not a substantial purpose or activity of these 
church-related colleges and universities,” thus “there is less likelihood than in primary and 
secondary schools that religion will permeate the area of secular education.  This reduces the risk 
that government aid will in fact serve to support religious activities.”); see also Mitchell v. Helms, 
530 U.S. 793, 837–38 (2000) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (noting that “actual diversion of 
government aid to religious indoctrination is in tension with our precedents” in cases of direct aid 
to religious institutions); Bd. of Educ. of Cent. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 245, 248 
(1968) (noting that “this Court has long recognized that religious schools pursue two goals, religious 
instruction and secular education,” but that secular textbooks and materials state provided to 
religious schools were not “instrumental in the teaching of religion” (emphasis added)). 
 172 Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2023 (2017) (quoting Locke 
v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 721–22 (2004)). 
 173 Tilton, 403 U.S. at 685–86 (“The ‘affirmative if not dominant policy’ of the instruction in pre-
college church schools is ‘to assure future adherents to a particular faith by having control of their 
total education at an early age.’” (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 671 (1970))). 
 174 Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2026 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). 
 175 See Hobbie v. Unemp’t Appeals Comm’n, 480 U.S. 136, 139–40 (1987); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 
U.S. 398, 409–10 (1963). 
 176 Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2023 (majority opinion) (“The claimant in Locke sought funding for 
an ‘essentially religious endeavor . . . akin to a religious calling as well as an academic pursuit,’ and 
opposition to such funding ‘to support church leaders’ lay at the historic core of the Religion 
Clauses. Here nothing of the sort can be said about a program to use recycled tires to resurface 
playgrounds.” (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted) (quoting Locke, 540 U.S. at 721–22)). 
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Amendments or compelled support provisions, and often provide grants to 
religious organizations for their secular activities.
177
  State interpretations of 
their respective Blaine Amendments vary considerably
178
 and compelled 
support provisions in particular generally do not bar religious organizations 
from receiving neutral, generally applicable government benefits for secular 
purposes.
179
  For instance, the Sixth Circuit found that a Michigan program 
providing direct reimbursements to downtown Detroit property owners for 
building façade refurbishment costs did not violate the state’s no-aid 
provision even though it included churches in the program.
180
  Finding that 
the program did not violate the federal Establishment Clause, the court 
applied Michigan courts’ interpretation of the no-aid provision as being 
consistent with its federal counterpart.
181
 
Moreover, even where courts have acknowledged that their state’s 
constitutional no-aid provision draws a more stringent line than the federal 
Establishment Clause, many have not found that the provisions bar 
government funding to religious organizations for secular purposes.
182
  For 
example, despite a no-aid provision that facially prohibits direct and indirect 
funding of religious entities,
183
 Florida courts have allowed pervasively 
religious institutions to provide secular social services programs.
184
  Even the 
Missouri Supreme Court, which has historically strictly interpreted its state’s 
no-aid provision, noted the secular character of religiously affiliated Saint 
Louis University’s proposed sports arena in holding that government funding 
for the arena did not violate the state’s establishment clause.
185
 
In addition, evidence that state legislatures enacted no-aid provisions due 
to any hostility to religion is likely to be insufficient to demonstrate “animus” 
violative of the Free Exercise Clause.
186
  “The [Locke] Court rejected the 
 
 177 Katz, supra note 169, at 113 (“Many states have adopted programs that fund the secular charitable 
operations of faith-based organizations.”). 
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 180 Am. Atheists, Inc. v. City of Detroit Downtown Dev. Auth., 567 F.3d 278, 301 (6th Cir. 2009). 
 181 Id. at 301. 
 182 See, e.g., Council for Secular Humanism, Inc. v. McNeil, 44 So. 3d 112, 119 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
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 184 Council for Secular Humanism, 44 So. 3d at 119. 
 185 Saint Louis Univ. v. Masonic Temple Ass’n of St. Louis, 220 S.W.3d 721, 728 (Mo. 2007) (“[Saint 
Louis University’s] proposed sports arena is intended to redevelop a blighted area of [St. Louis] 
and provide an avenue for secular student and community events; its purpose is not to advance 
religion.”). 
 186 See Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 720–21, 724–25 (2004); cf. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, 
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notion . . . that lack of facial neutrality toward religion by a state program will 
render it unconstitutional.”
187
  State compelled support provisions “can be 
traced to the first state constitutions that often predate the First 
Amendment”;
188
 thus, the requisite legislative history is likely to be 
unavailable.  With respect to state Blaine Amendments, Professor Lantta 
notes that “[w]hile anti-Catholic animus was no doubt the impetus for the 
federal amendment, ‘that sentiment is rarely evident in the legislative debates 
surrounding the enactments’ of the various state amendments.”
189
 
More importantly, “many if not most state constitutions have been re-
ratified since the inclusion of the Blaine amendments, which probably 
‘cleanses’ them of any improper motivation that may have initially existed.”
190
  
Voters have specifically rejected attempts to remove language prohibiting 
funding to sectarian institutions from state constitutions.  For example, in a 
2012 referendum, Florida voters overwhelmingly rejected the proposed 
amendment 8 to their state constitution, which would have deleted existing 
no-aid provision language and “add[ed] language prohibiting the denial of 
government benefits and support on the basis of religious identity or 
belief.”
191
  Amendment 8 did not receive the required sixty percent of the 
vote in any county and garnered a majority in only six of Florida’s sixty-seven 
counties.
192
 
Finally, federalism concerns may ensure the viability of state Blaine 
Amendments and compelled support clauses. Constitutional rights have 
often been described with a “floor/ceiling metaphor”: the federal 
Constitution provides the floor—the minimum level of protection—and state 
constitutions provide a ceiling.
193
  Thus, states have latitude to enact 
constitutional provisions that expand or contract substantive rights as long as 
they stay within the minimum guidelines of the federal Constitution.  The 
Establishment Clause confers substantive rights, as evidenced by the unique 
taxpayer standing to challenge suspect legislative enactments under it.
194
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Accordingly, state Blaine Amendments can also be construed as expanding 
Establishment Clause rights beyond the federal minimum.  Such an 
interpretation should be more than adequate where the nature of state 
funding programs threatens religious indoctrination, as with school voucher 
programs. 
CONCLUSION 
Despite the sweeping pronouncement of “discrimination” against 
religious entities in the government funding context as “odious to our 
Constitution,”
195
 Trinity Lutheran’s reasoning should remain limited to the 
context in which it was decided.  Broad interpretation of the majority’s 
nondiscrimination principle severely narrows the “play in the joints” between 
the Religion Clauses, where governments are free to exercise “benevolent 
neutrality” towards religion.
196
 
Further, expansive application of the decision’s principles may lead to 
unintended and undesired results for religious and secular entities alike in 
the receipt and application of government benefits and accommodations.  
Accordingly, the relatively innocuous facts of the case should guide and 
restrict future interpretations, lest the Free Exercise Clause be expanded to 
render a swath of rational state constitutional amendments a virtual nullity. 
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